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Glas’s rich article makes several useful points about both anxiety and enactivism, and about 
how enactivism can help conceptualize anxiety in a suitably complex way. I agree that we 
need to characterize anxiety as an embedded, context-sensitive and temporally evolving 
phenomenon with layered symptoms. As Glas points out, the enactive approach has useful 
conceptual tools for doing so, because of its incorporation of the theoretical apparatus of 
dynamical systems theory. I am sympathetic with most of what Glas says about this point, 
so I shall not dwell on it any further. 
 I want to focus instead on Glas’s discussion of self-referentiality, which I found 
interesting and valuable but also in need of further explication, and possibly not wholly 
consistent with enactivism. Mainly as an invitation for Glas to say more about this notion, in 
this commentary I explain where I think his understanding of self-referentiality appears to 
diverge from some of the core tenets of enactivism.  
On p. 8 Glas writes that “emotions are by definition self-referential. If there is no 
self-referentiality, even after attempts at clarification, the putative emotion is just a 
physiological state or a sensation” (italics mine). I agree with him that emotions are self-
referential, in the sense that they reveal something about the person undergoing the 
emotion. Thus anxiety, for example, reveals “one’s vulnerability for being left alone” or 
“one’s fear for failure” (p. 7). This idea is not inconsistent with the enactive approach to 
emotion and affectivity (although it has not been much discussed), because enactivism 
acknowledges, like appraisal theories of emotion do, that emotions embody and disclose 
our interests and values. So enactivists can agree with Glas that an episode of anxiety (as 
well as of anger, jealousy, and so on) indicates (signifies) something about the person 
undergoing it—her values, needs, and concerns.  
Where the passage quoted above appears to be in tension with the enactivist 
approach to emotion is in the assumption that “a physiological state or a sensation” is “just” 
that. Here Glas’s claim echoes traditional, “disembodied” cognitivist accounts of emotion, 
according to which bodily arousal and bodily sensations, without accompanying intentional 
(i.e., world-directed, contentful) evaluations or judgements, are mere physiological 
happenings (see, e.g., Solomon 1984; Nussbaum 2004). Importantly, however, the enactive 
account of emotion rejects the dichotomy between cognitive appraisals and bodily arousal, 
and the accompanying assumption that bodily arousal is “just” bodily happenings, “just” or 
“mere” physiology (Colombetti 2014, chapter 4). A physiological response, be it as part of 
jealousy or love, but also of panic, hunger or fatigue, is for enactivism a response that is 
meaningful for the organism undergoing it—it is, at its minimum, good or bad for the 
organism, and it says something about the organism’s relation to the environment. It may 
well be that physiological responses occur without the person (or even a therapist) being 
able to say why or what the response is about. This, however, does not make the response a 





meaningless “mere” physiological response. If the response does not fit into a clinical 
narrative and cannot be linked up with the person’s beliefs and evaluations, it does not 
follow that it is “just” a bodily process. From an enactivist perspective, a physiological 
response is a sense-making activity and thus a cognitive-affective form of understanding, an 
implicit embodied way in which the organism appraises its situation. The upshot is that for 
the enactivist there are no “mere physiological states” that are not self-referential—they all 
say something about the organism and its inherent normativity (Di Paolo 2005). Notice that 
this form of self-referentiality need not be accompanied by consciousness. A bacterium 
presumably does not feel anything, and yet its swimming up a sugar gradient reveals that it 
evaluates sugar as good for its survival.  
This point relates to other passages in the article that it would be useful to hear 
more about. For example, on p. 11 Glas writes that  
 
embodying an interest is conceptually not the same as self-referentiality, but it is an 
empirical approximation of it. Self-referentiality is caught in a theory about how 
emotions help us protect our interests. Emotions reveal our concerns, not so much 
symbolically, as a form of signification, but psycho-biologically.  
 
As I see it, that emotions embody interests and reveal our concerns “psycho-
biologically” is very much what the enactive approach to emotions claims, and entails self-
referentiality: an embodied interest, as an interest, reveals something about what the 
organism in question cares about. It seems that Glas would disagree with this point, but 
then what is it for “embodying an interest” to be an “empirical approximation” of self-
referentiality? It seems, here and in other passages, that Glas wants to draw a separation 
between non- (or perhaps “quasi-”) self-referential psycho-biological interests and other 
kinds of interest. The latter may be something like more sophisticated, “cognitive” interests 
that can enter into a conceptual-discursive narrative, and that as such make emotions 
properly self-referential—as in the case of Mr A.’s anxiety, which is explained with reference 
to aspects of Mr A.’s life, personality, and interpretation of his situation (e.g., the 
incompatibility of the demands of work and family). Placing anxious responses in the 
context of the person’s history and constructing a narrative that explains those responses is 
certainly useful to help the person understand and deal with anxiety. But one of the 
messages of the enactive approach, as I understand it, is also to grant that traditionally 
“mere” physiological responses reveal something about how the organism makes sense of 
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